
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BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

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
THE RELIGIOUS REALISM OF J. B. PRATT

by

Arthur Elliot Harrington

(A. B. University of Redlands, 1936)


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
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

The chief object of philosophical inquiry since the beginning of the history of philosophy has been the understanding of the ultimate reality of the universe. This search for ultimate truth has led to the questioning of the nature of human experience, the nature of human knowledge, the nature of the universe, and the ultimate values of life. These questions have led to the development of three fields of study in philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics or axiology. The question as to the reality and nature of God is not confined to anyone of these fields. All three fields are involved in any systematically consistent endeavor to understand the whole truth.


I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. The purpose of this thesis is to expound and criticise Professor Pratt's (1) correspondence theory of truth as it involves the basis for the idea of God, (2) his epistemology and metaphysics as a background, and (3) his conception of the nature of God, its theoretical, practical, and ethical implications; and to propound the unsolved problems of Professor Pratt's hypothesis offering possible alternative solutions.



Brief analysis of the problem. The problem of the criteria of truth arises as a necessary basis for all philosophy. Professor Pratt believes that truth can be found in experience. This is the correspondence theory of truth. It holds that a thing is true when the judgment corresponds with the object. It all sounds sensible at first, but the problem arises when it is discovered that there is no verification of this correspondence of the judgment with the object. The correspondence theory lacks verification.


Another theory of truth which is really a criterion of truth is coherence. Professor Pratt accepts coherence as a test for truth, but when dealing with the existential world he turns to the correspondence theory saying that the test of coherence does not apply to judgments concerning the existential world. By the coherence theory it is maintained that the ultimate criterion for truth is systematic consistency. Coherence is a theory which includes other theories such as pragmatism and rationalism. It takes into account all of experience and tries to explain it in a rationally systematic and consistent way. Professor Pratt does not accept the whole coherence theory, but accepts only coherence as a test of truth other than that regarding the existential world. The problem is to find coherent verification for the correspondence theory, or rejecting it, to find a better criterion of truth.



The next problem to arise is the problem of knowledge. This epistemological problem has been a starting point for most philosophies ever since Descartes first opened up the question of the possibility of the non-existence of certain qualities which are perceived. The problem briefly is a question as to whether the object of perception and the real object are alike or different. Does experience reveal reality?

The metaphysical problem is a problem as to the ultimate reality of the universe. Is matter real and the only reality, or are both mind and matter ultimately real and independently real? Professor Pratt is both an epistemological dualist and a metaphysical dualist. He believes that knowledge is indirect, and that both mind and matter are independently real. If mind and matter are both real, how can one influence the other or vice versa? How did matter originate? What is matter?

Professor Pratt goes to much pain to refute materialistic naturalism, yet his conception of God is so inclined to make God's values so far from man that in the end one wonders if such a conception is any more fruitful to man than materialism itself. However, there are some characteristics attributed to God which seem to meet with reality much more coherently than does materialism.



These ethical implications of such a God as Professor

Pratt describes are a problem. If God's values are beyond

man's appreciation, and if God is not interested in man, then

man's values must be of no eternal significance. Again, a

God who acts entirely spontaneously making all of his purposes

immediately efficient seems to be the kind of a God that has

no permanent values, but who acts just about as he feels like

it. Is such a God an ethical God? Professor Pratt seems to


sacrifice the goodness of God in order to make him all powerful

and yet allow for the evil in the world.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Many of the terms that will be used in this thesis are terms which will have to be defined as they are used, for they are part of the hypothesis. Many other terms are terms that are commonly used by philosophers and which in many cases will need no definition. The following terms defined are terms which either having been used by Professor Pratt are more easily defined here, or which are terms which have been applied to Professor Pratt's hypothesis.

Existent. The term refers to that which is physically real. Qualities which may be perceived are not necessarily physical realities. Existents are those things which are independently and physically real, which are metaphysically real.



Essence. The term refers to that which is not physically real as an existent but that which has real qualities in the realm of experience. An essence exists only in the conceptual world.


The correspondence theory of truth. This is the theory of truth which states that truth is the correspondence of a judgment with its object. It will be defined more in detail in the following chapter.

Coherence. The term means systematic consistency. To be coherent one must conform to the laws of contradiction and identity. "Any judgment is true, if it is both pelf-consistent and coherently connected with our system of judgments as a whole."1

Coherence may be used as a test for truth without the acceptance of the whole theory of coherence which implies a synoptic view of all the criteria of truth. As a test for truth it means that the truth must be consistent with itself. The whole theory implies a systematic consistency of the whole realm of knowledge.

Transcendental values. Though Professor Pratt does not use this terminology, it is used in this thesis in referring to his conception of God as having values which are beyond the

l Brightman, ITP, 59-61. Explanation of this and subsequent abbreviations is to be found in the bibliography.



ability of man to understand or appreciate. It likewise in part refers to the very similar, if not the same, conception of God as being disinterested in human welfare.


III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The remainder of the thesis follows in the order which seems to fit best the progress of thought, starting first with the theory of truth, progressing on to the establishment of the epistemological and metaphysical hypotheses, upon which the idea of God is built.

Chapter II is the exposition and the criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. It challenges the theory as having no method of verification, and offers coherence as a method of verifying that which corresponds in experience.

consideration is given to the nature and reality of mental content. The efficiency of purpose through the mind-body relationship, making purpose causal is likewise discussed and criticised.

Chapter IV deals with the main hypothesis considered in this thesis: "Spiritual Pantheism". Other hypotheses are refuted and Professor Pratt's conception expounded and criticised. The pantheistic world soul, the finite self, their relationships to the world and their purposes are discussed.




Chapter V summarizes and concludes the problems.

The problems are divided into three different groups:

the problems implied, the problems unsolved, and the problems solved. It also includes suggestions for alternative solutions.

The thesis is concluded with a summary and a classified bibliography.




CHAPTER II

THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

There are two opposing theories of truth: rationalism and empiricism. Briefly, rationalism is the belief that only through reason can truth be found. Certain truths must be accepted a priori and all other truth deduced from these, thus building a coherent system of thought. Empiricism on the opposite extreme holds that only through experience can truth be found. These two theories of truth do not always oppose each other. Some philosophers are quite rationalistic and yet they are also empirical. They accept the laws of reason, and may develop quite a rationalistic system which explains the facts of experience. However, the rationalist is more apt to interpret his experience in a rational manner, while the empiricist is more apt to formulate all of his conceptions by comparing one experience with the sum total of experiences.

Professor Pratt is an empiricist. Yet he also at times employs a form of rationalism. "It is the task of thought to put together the facts which experience provides, under the guidance of laws of logic, so as to tain a more nearly complete and self-consistent conception of the real world in which our destinies are cast." This and other statements

¹ Pratt, PR, 2.



show how rationalism at times enters into his thinking.

But the correspondence theory of truth is a basic

principle in his whole philosophy. This theory denounces

rationalism as a means of finding existential truth, and

proclaims that only through experience can the truth of the

existential world be found. However, coherence is accepted

as a good method to be employed in finding the essence of


reality. The existential world can be proved by the

correspondence of a judgment with its object. But the

conceptual world can be proved by its coherence.

Professor Pratt establishes the correspondence theory of truth before establishing his dualistic realism; but the two are very closely related and are interdependent. The realistic hypothesis suggests the correspondence theory of truth and in turn is dependent upon it. Though Professor Pratt does not acknowledge it, the correspondence theory of truth presupposes an objective independent reality of physical things. "The correspondence theory defines truth as the correspondence of a judgment with its object." Before a judgment can correspond with its object, the object must be real if the truth is to be considered as ultimate. Professor Pratt admits that self-consistency and coherence are verifications of conceptual truth, but

² Pratt, PR, 75.



denies that existential truth must be verified before
it can be considered as truth. He says that existential
truth can be experienced as being independently true without
verification.

Now one of the most important considerations in proving the truth of a judgment is its self-consistency and its coherence with the mass of our recognized and established truths. Coherence is recognized by the upholders of the correspondence theory as an important, perhaps the most important, test of truth. But the test of a thing is not the thing tested. The proof of the pudding is the eating; but the eating presupposes the pudding. Coherence is a way of telling a true judgment, a necessary condition which a judgment must fulfill before we can be sure that it is true; but when we are dealing with the existential world coherence is not what we mean by the truth of the judgment.³

The correspondence theory of truth is not the test of truth, it is only a definition of truth. 4 A true judgment is one that corresponds to reality. But how can one compare a judgment with reality? Once can not compare a judgment with reality for reality is not accessible. One can only compare a judgment with one's experience of reality. As to the real nature of the object which one experiences, it can not be known except through a rational interpretation of the experience. It is not possible to compare ideas, which are a part of experience, with any reality which is not a part of experience. Man can not go beyond the realm of experience to obtain an object to see if it corresponds with the judgment

³ Pratt, PR, 78.

⁴ Brightman, ITP, 35 and 49-50.




of it in experience. Only ideas within the realm of experience can be compared. In this latter sense of the correspondence of ideas then perhaps it could be said that one idea corresponds to another, but it cannot be said that an idea corresponds to reality beyond the realm of experience.

Our judgment of reality should correspond with reality, but this can only be known by verifying the truth about reality by using the criterion of coherence. The correspondence theory of truth lacks verification. Before a judgment of anything can be considered true it just be shown to be coherent, self-consistent, and consistent with all the known facts of experience.

The personal idealist will accept the correspondence theory of truth as a description of truth; but to be proved as truth the correspondence of the judgment with its object must be verified. The personal idealist objects to the acceptance of the independent reality of physical objects unless it can be coherently verified. Thus far a coherent verification of the realistic hypothesis seems to have been impossible.

The realists seem to fear that the personal idealist will deny the truth of scientific data. The personal idealist does not deny scientific truth, but recognizes it as being phenomenally true rather than being metaphysically true.

Science observes and records the sequence of physical events,



but it does not explain the underlying cause of it all.

This is beyond the field of science and should not be a question for the scientist to try to solve. It is a question for the philosopher to explore. The nature of such questions lies beyond the realm of physical observation.⁵

The coherence criterion looks beyond the mere self-consistency of propositions to a comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience. . . Any judgment is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system of judgments as a whole. ⁷

The correspondence theory of truth only describes the truth which must ultimately be verified by its self-consistency and coherence before it can be accepted as true. Though it can not be accepted, dualistic realism remains to be discussed.

⁵ Bowne, Personalism, 274-275.

⁶ Brightman, ITP, 59.

⁷ Brightman, ITP, 61.




CHAPTER III

THE REALISTIC HYPOTHESIS OF J. B. PRATT

This chapter might well be divided into three chapters; but in as much as the main part of this thesis is Professor Pratt's conception of God, these three main points serve as a basis for that conception and are rightly part of the whole realistic hypothesis. The first section will be a consideration of the epistemological dualism of Professor Pratt. The second section will deal with his metaphysical dualism. And the third section will be a discussion of the mind-body problem as presented by Professor Pratt.

I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM

The first attempt at realistic epistemology was made by Locke in the Seventeenth Century. In his attempt he made a sharp division between one's mental content and everything else. This implied theoretically that it would be impossible to have any object save our own ideas. The skeptical outcome of this attempt at dualistic epistemology led to the avoiding of the problems of such a dualism by attempting to establish a realistic hypothesis without dualism. But, Professor Pratt says, these attempts to get along without dualism have involved as many difficulties as Locke's. Idealistic thinkers are




satisfied to say that a realistic epistemology is unstable, but Professor Pratt believes that this is unnecessary and not the truth. It should be recognized, however, that not all idealists would agree that a realistic epistemology is unstable even though they might agree that the realist's metaphysics is unsound.

Rather than discard all possibilities of realism

Professor Pratt believes that it is possible to remove these objectionable aspects found in both Locke's Dualism and in the New Realism. This he proposes to do by taking the sound elements from both.

The chief weakness of Locke's epistemology was his refusal to allow for any object other than one's own mental content. New Realism attempted to get around this difficulty by saying that the mind could directly intuit physical things. Professor Pratt would modify this attempt of New Realism by refusing to admit that one can directly intuit physical things or existents, but saying that one could refer to them, or conceive of them. Yet one can also refer to, or conceive of objects containing particular combinations of qualities which would not necessarily have any existential status whatsoever, but would be purely objects in the field of essence. Such objects would not be existential objects, but only objects in the sense that they are the things referred to by the

¹ Pratt, PR, 190.



subject. Mental content then would not be synonymous with
the mind or the subject, but would be an essence which was
neither the epistemological subject nor the ontological
object, but the epistemological object, a separate entity. The
epistemological object may be referred to as mental content.

It may correspond to the ontological object in the perceiving
of an existent, or it may be just an essence which has no
existential reality. If the mind can refer to mental content
which has no ontological objectivity, then it may also
attribute to ontological objects qualities which are directly
intended, or which were not necessarily intended. Professor
Pratt would say that these qualities are directly intended.

While it is true that we cannot directly intuit physical things and other existents outside our own mental content, can we not refer to them, or conceive them, thus making them our objects or referends; and can we not, at the same time, conceive particular combinations of qualities which have a logical rather than an existential status? If the mind can do these things (and it seems to me experience shows that it can), it plainly is able also to attribute to the conceived but not intuited existents the qualities thus directly intended. To put it in briefer and more technical terms, I can see no reason to doubt that the mind can have an epistemological object and conceive it as characterizing an existent or ontological object.²


It seems very possible that if the mind has the power to conceive of non-existent objects, it might also have the power to conceive of existents with qualities directly intended. But how do we know that these qualities of existents are

² Pratt, PR, 191.

directly intended? If they are directly intended, who intended that they should be just as they were conceived to be? Is it not equally possible that those so called intended qualities might be quite different from the qualities experienced? Is it not equally possible that if the mind has the power to conceive of qualities where there is no existent object involved, that it might also conceive of qualities attributed to an existent which were not necessarily intended, but which were attributed because of the nature of the human perception?

This claim that the mind can conceive of the qualities attributed to existents as they are intended, is a claim which must be put in the realm of possibilities, but which along with many other elements in the realistic hypothesis cannot be verified. That the existential world exists just as we conceive it, is really more of an expression of faith or a wish than a self-consistent and coherent statement of reality. This must be taken as an a priori along with the correspondence theory of truth and the general realistic hypothesis all of which are more or less interdependent on this same a priori acceptance of the reality of the existential world.

Although it is not agreed that one's mental content characterizes existential objects, the main hypothesis of epistemological dualism is not based primarily upon this realistic interpretation of it. Epistemological dualism may



be accepted as readily by the idealist as by the realist. 3 Epistemological dualism is the hypothesis that in the process of knowing the existential world there are two factors, the subject and the object. Knowledge of the existential is always indirect and representative. The personal idealists will agree with Professor Pratt here. Professor Pratt recognizes this dualism of subject and object thus recognizing that knowledge of the physical world must be indirect and representative. He differentiates between the epistemological object and the ontological object. But having done this he turns right around and says that he believes that the epistemological object characterizes the ontological object. Thus man conceives the physical world just about as it is. Though qualities belong to the realm of essence rather than to the realm of existents, those qualities conceived in the mental content which characterize the existents are intended as qualities of the existents.

As seen from previous discussion, this parallel of the epistemological object with the ontological object is essential to the empirical method which Professor Pratt uses to establish his realistic hypothesis. The correspondence theory of truth is that truth is the correspondence of a judgment with its object. The whole theory rests upon this one a priori conception that the epistemological object must


³ Knudson, PP, 363.

characterize the ontological object. If the judgment of experience does not actually parallel or characterize the existential object, then there is absolutely nothing to the correspondence theory of truth; for one's experience or judgment would not be the same as the object judged, and though it appeared to be the same in experience it still would not be in reality.

It may be agreed that Professor Pratt's epistemological dualism is coherent to the extent that the subject and object are two different things, and that knowledge about the physical world is always indirect. But to say that the epistemological object characterizes the ontological object is an assumption. Before this can be accepted as true it must be verified by coherent reason.

II. METAPHYSICAL DUALISM

Most of the realists of history have held to a monistic realism. They have believed that only matter is real, or that neither matter nor mind are real, but that both come from something else which they may call a neutral entity. Professor Pratt feels that this is just an attempt to escape the real mind-body problem and in doing so that they run into more difficulties than they would to have faced the real problem.



Professor Pratt holds that there are two realities in the universe: mind and matter. Though they are independent realities, they interact with each other in the same way as the human mind and body. In this section the metaphysical nature of each will be discussed. The following section is devoted to interaction as seen in the mind-body problem.


Mind. Though mind may deal with a non-existent object of the conceptual realm, the mind itself is an existent.

Professor Pratt in distinguishing between the epistemological problem and the mind-body problem definitely speaks of psychical existents. Mind is just as real as matter; psychical existents are just as real as physical existents.

Once it is really brought home to idealists as well as realists that the mind-body problem is not concerned with cognition and its object, but with the non-cognitive relation between a psychical existent and a physical existent, it should at last be recognized even by them that, no matter how uninteresting the problem may be, it is at least real and natural. . . . It is difficult to see how anyone can seriously maintain that the question of the relation of his thoughts to his brain is purely arbitarary and artificial. 4

Though this may seem to be more primarily concerned with the mind-body problem than with the existence of the mind, it reveals Professor Fratt's real recognition of the mind as an existent as well as, or better than, any other quotation. Not only does he speak of psychical existents,

⁴ Pratt, PR, 222.



but the whole problem to which he is referring is a problem that would not exist without the acceptance of a metaphysical dualism of mind and matter.

Professor Pratt finds it more necessary to spend time establishing the reality of matter than the reality of mind. Mind is presupposed by any attempt at thought, meaning, or knowledge. Any attempt at knowledge which does not recognize mind as a reality really refutes itself, whether the refutation be recognized or not.

The activities involved in knowing as depicted in the account I have suggested are, frankly, incompatible with a view of the mind which would make it either a physiological process of the organism, or a passive succession of psychoses -- just so much passing content. The activities of thought, of meaning, of transcendence which are involved in anything that I can regard as an adequate account of the knowing process presupposes the reality of an active self. In spite of what seems to me its manifest superiority to the other forms of realistic epistemology, I do not see how Critical Realism can really be "worked" without the recognition of mental activity and a subject which acts. 5

Though this is a discussion of the metaphysical reality of mind, we find that it is presupposed in Professor Pratt's epistemology. His approach as seen above is mostly pragmatic. That is, the experience of meaning implies a subject to which it is meaningful. However, there is also an appeal to coherence. In the following quotation this is more evident.

⁵ Pratt, PR, 203-204.

The same unavoidable implication of consciousness or mind is involved in the attempt of both Objective Relativism and Instrumentalism to deal with the question of knowledge without reference to anything subjective or mental. For them as for the Neo-roalists knowledge is a relation between objects and involves no subject. 6

Now the picture of knowledge thus resulting appears to me, personally, I confess, as unrecognizable as Hamlet without the Prince. In the mere relation of objects to each other, or to a nervous system, or to the action of a nervous system in the presence of "given" objects, I can find nothing even remotely resembling what I know and experience as the act of knowing. I can put no meaning into the assertion of knowledge when there is no subject to do the knowing. T


Professor Pratt's main argument may be summed up in saying that mind is presupposed in experience and in thinking. The argument is largely empirical. Though there is an element of coherence in it, the emphasis does not seem to fall on the synoptic view. He says little if anything about memory and self-identity as being of any significance to the reality of mind. He likewise says very little or nothing about values being personal, or about values having any special significance as to the reality of a self.

However, in the chapter in Personal Realism titled "Knowledge and Self" Professor Pratt implies that his argument is rational.

The type of argument I have used in criticism of all these schools is in considerable degree epistemological. It seems to show -- and in my opinion it does show -- that recognition, thought, knowledge presuppose a subject....

⁶ Pratt, PR, 188.

⁷ Pratt, PR, 189.




If, therefore, a sound epistemology shows that such things as recognition and thought are maningless unless there be a unifying subject or self, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that such a self does actually be... If such an admission seems to the idealist dangerously realistic, let him do with it what he can. Let us hope, at any rate, that his loyalty to reason will prove stronger than some anti-realistic prejudice. 8

Professor Pratt is of course referring here to the absolute idealist and not to the personal idealist, for the personal idealist recognizes the reality of the human self as being a self separate from the eternal self. On the subject of the reality of mind and of the self personal idealists agree very closely with Professor Pratt. They may vary slightly in their approach by employing more of the synoptic view. Personal idealists will likewise agree closely on the subject of the mind-body problem, but the greatest contention that arises is on the problem of the ultimately real. This is our next problem. Though there seems to be a great gap between idealism and realism, perhaps there is more agreement on such things as the reality of mind and of the self than has been supposed.

However, there is some variation as to the nature of the self, even though they are in agreement that the self really exists. Professor Pratt believes the self to be an invisible and intangible substance. He believes it rust be


⁸ Pratt, PR, 288-89.



a substance because it can possess qualities. This subject is discussed further in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that there does seem to be some difference in thinking of the self as that which we know as consciousness, and as that which is a substance which though invisible and intangible has qualities and characteristics.


Matter. Having established mind as a reality by recognizing that all experience and knowledge implies a subject, a self, a knower; the task of establishing matter as a reality awaits us, and appears to be even more difficult than the first. To the materialist and to the behaviorist this would be simple, for they accept it a priori as being real even to the extent that they feel obliged to try to explain all consciousness by it; but for the idealist and the dualistic realist the problem is more difficult.

Professor Pratt is an empiricist when dealing with the existential world. As we have seen in the study of the epistemological problem, he differentiates between the epistemological object and the ontological object; yet he says that the two objects correspond, and that the epistemological object even has those qualities which are intended by the ontological object. Referring back to the chapter on the correspondence theory of truth, it is readily seen that the correspondence theory is a basic principle in



Professor Pratt's realistic hypothesis. Though he first establishes the correspondence theory of truth, the two are very closely related and interdependent. The whole thing is an a priori acceptance of human experience as the true revealer of the fundamental reality of the existential world. Professor Pratt says the correspondence theory needs no verification to prove the correspondence of the judgment with its object. If the judgment corresponds with the object as experienced it is true. He admits that truth must be verified by coherence in the conceptual world. But in the world of existents no verification is needed. If the judgment corresponds with the object it is considered by Professor Pratt to be true.

The correspondence theory of truth cannot be accepted without verification, yet in all fairness to Professor Pratt, his empirical arguments should be followed as he employs them in the establishment of his realistic hypothesis. There are three things of importance which must be accounted for in our experience: (1) the fact that experiences pop into our minds quite unexpectedly and oftentimes without similar previous experience: (2) the fact that not only do we receive sense stimuli, but two or more persons receive the very same stimuli; and (3) the fact that physical objects, such as burning wood, continue in their process being unwatched and unthought of by any human being. When a fire is left burning




one returns to find the fuel consumed. These common experiences demand an explanation, and Professor Pratt says that realism gives the best account of all of these experiences.

Other hypotheses, however, also take these experiences into account. To be sure the objective idealist, who holds that all reality is only a matter of the individual's experience, is indeed unable really to explain these experiences. The only way he sets around them is to refuse to consider them. But the absolute idealist can explain these experiences coherently. He says that all these experiences are the experiences of God and therefore need no further explanation. His difficulty arises in the explanation of the relationship of the finite self to the absolute self. There is nothing in these three types of experience which the personal idealist does explain.

The personal idealist will agree with the realist in saying that these experiences are explainable because something external to all human beings who experience things really does exist. But the personal idealist says that these objects are not an independent reality; they are only phenomenally real. 10 That which we experience is objective to us. It is not just our mind. It exists independent of our human minds. These activities in the physical realm are not dependent upon human perception or conception. Thus all of the experiences which

⁹ Pratt, PR, 142-44.

¹⁰ Knudson, DG, 138-39.



Professor Pratt explains by realism are also explainable by personal idealism. The difference is not in the objective reality in experience, but in a difference of opinion as to what the nature of the objective reality is. Professor Pratt says that it is matter. The personal idealist says that it is the mind or will of God.

Professor Pratt definitely rejects this distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. He says that there is no good reason for making such a distinction. "...the point of view presented in this volume does not recognize the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal realms."


The only way that a non-spacial reality and a spacial reality can be related is through the one's creating the other or the two's interacting with each other. The materialist says matter creates mind. The idealist says mind creates matter. The dualistic realist says both mind and matter exist independently and interact with each other.

The materialist doctrine destroys even the possibility of reason, and is thus totally incoherent. It is refuted more in detail elsewhere in this thesis.

The personal idealist solves the problem, by denying the metaphysical reality of matter. 12 Matter is really only real in the realm of experience. In the realm of metaphysics

¹¹ Pratt, PR, 139.

¹² See Knudson, PP, 362f., for refutation of "natural realism."




only mind is real. That which is experienced as matter is really the mind of God. This does not mean that matter is not real. It is real in experience; but metaphysically it is the mind of God or the will of God.

The personal realist solves the problem by saying that meta-hysically mind and matter are both real and that the unity of the two is achieved through an interaction between the two which is like the interaction between the human self and body.

Both personal idealism and personal realism have their difficulties. The personal idealist leaves the question with a difficult explanation as to how non-spatial mind is made spatial in experience. It is the will of God made real by God in His experience and human experience. The personal realist leaves the question with a difficult explanation as to how non-spatial mind can interact with a spatial reality.

Both the personal idealist and the personal realist explain the facts of experience through the interaction of the self with the objective world. But the personal idealist says that it is actually an interaction of the self with the will of God; while the realist says that it is an interaction of the self with a real and independently real existential world.


Now it is easier to explain the interaction of mind with mind, so it is easier to see how interaction is possible if the ultimate reality of the physical is the mind of God.



Thus interaction is between two minds and not between mind and physical reality. Thus in this aspect of the problem, the personal idealist can explain the situation more easily than the personal realist.

However, when it comes to the matter as to how the mind of God is nade objectively real in human experience, it seems that the personal idealist is in almost as embarrassing a difficulty as the personal realist on the question as to how two things so utterly different could interact. The only way that the personal idealist can get around this problem is to say that that which is objectively real in human experience is not metaphysically real. Petaphysically it is mind. Thus to the realist this appears to be making the objectively real in human experience really an illusion. This is naturally very objectionable to his realistic way of looking at the universe.

Let it be kept in mind here that though Professor Pratt believes in the complete immanence of God in the universe, he also believes that matter is an independent reality. He refuses to make any distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Matter is an existential reality, existing in its own right. The correspondence of this judgment with the object, matter, as we experience it needs no verification. The universe has two metaphysical realities which interact with each other: mind and matter.




III. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

In the endeavor to find the truth regarding the reality of matter, the subject of God and His relation to matter has come into the discussion. However, let us not confuse this with the mind-body problem. Though Professor Pratt likens the relationship of God and the physical universe to that of the human self and its body, it is not the subject to be discussed here. The problem here is the relation of the human mind to the nerve centers in the human body. It is a fitting subject to be included in this chapter for interaction becomes part of the main realistic hypothesis.

The physiologists of today have been able to trace the nervous system. They have been able to observe the psychophysiological process of the passing of a stimulus through the various sense organs, through the sensory neurons, from dendrites to axons composing the synapse, to arious nerve centers, from which often comes a return motor stimulus through an entirely different set of neurons, the motor neurons, passing from synapse to the muscles where they cause activity in space. 13


This nervous activity, though it can be traced physiologically, is not synonymous with mind or consciousness. When a person receives a stimulus he is not conscious of all of this activity going on, he is only conscious of the sensation

¹³ Goodenough, DP, 71-81, 83-112.



at the locality where the stimulus was given. Likewise when he decides to move his finger he is not conscious of all the nervous activity going through the various motor neurons, but he wills to move it and it moves. Sometimes he is not conscious of even willing the activity, it may came rather spontaneously from a habit which makes a motor response in a lower nerve center. By concentration on this physical side of the question, many students have thought that mind is herely the result of the functioning of this highly developed nervous system. Almost everyone admits that the development of this nervous system has a lot to do with the functioning of mind, but there are many who believe that there must be an element of mind which is more than just the functioning of the physical organism, and which must direct to a large extent some of the physical organism's activities. Professor Pratt is one of those who believes that the mind is a separate reality. In his hypothesis of dualistic realism both mind and matter are real. Thus the problem here is a problem as to the relation of mind and matter in life.

Professor Fratt recognizes the foregoing physiological facts, but wishes to establish the relationship between what is known as consciousness in experience to the main centers of the physiological nervous system. The physical brain and the mind are by no means synonymous, yet they seem to influence each other. How do they influence each other?




A monist solves the problem by saying that either one or the other is really the other and so there is no problem; but the dualist must make some explanation or find some hypothesis to explain the apparent relationship. Some idealists have held to the theory of parallelism. This is the hypothesis that there is no actual relationship between the mind and the physical brain; but that God or nature has set up a system whereby the activity in one is paralleled by a conception or activity in the other. Neither affect the other in such a theory, but they both so along together as though timed for perfect harmony. Leibniz called such a theory of his the theory of pre-established harmony. This theory is conceivable, but it does not satisfactorily explain the facts of experience.

Parallelism also creates other problems equally as difficult. 14

Interaction of mind and body is apparently the only solution which meets the situation with but few difficulties. To be sure, there are many things about the hypothesis which can not be thoroughly explained. But there seems to be no way of explaining the facts of experience except through some hind of an interaction between the mind and the physical brain. The mind must be able to effect the brain to cause its purposes to be rade effective through the stimulating of the motor neurons thus causing motor activities. Likewise

¹⁴ Pratt, MAS, 88.



the physical nervous system must be able to act upon the mind to make it conscious of its physical environment. Thus the two in some manner interact with each other. Though this hypothesis of interaction of mind and body cannot be explained very tangibly, there is more evidence for it than against it.


The hypothesis of interaction of mind and body is the only consistent hypothesis which allows for the freedom of the human mind. Parallelism does not satisfactorily explain the facts of experience. 15 Mind acts purposively upon matter and matter influences mind. Epiphenomenalism must believe in determinism by the physical. Absolute idealism makes it all the mind of God, and thus allows for no freedom whatsoever.

Freedom is only an illusion to the absolute idealist. Even an idealism which allows for independent finite selves cannot allow for freedom without the acceptance of interaction between the mind end the objective world. Only the hypothesis of interaction of mind and body allows for the purposes of a finite mind to find expression by acting upon a physical universe. The reality of human purpose is dependent upon the reality of the hypothesis of interaction of mind and body. 16

Professor Pratt cites four difficulties which make it hard for some to accept interaction: (1) Mind and body are so different in nature that it is difficult to see how they

¹⁵ See Pratt, MAS, 88; and Dotterer, PWS, 206.

¹⁶ Macintosh, RR, 44-47.



could influence or interact with each other. (2) There seems to be an incompatibility between the hypothesis of interaction and the law of the conservation of energy. (3) It is evident that consciousness is partly dependent upon physical conditions.

(4) The conception of mind is vague and confusing making it difficult to see how it could interact with the body. 17

The first of these difficulties can be settled only

by showing that all types of causation are of such a nature

that it is difficult to understand them. It is difficult to

explain the pull of the moon upon the ocean causing high and

low tides. We know that there is such a pull, because we can

measure the pull that smaller bodies have upon one another.

But as to the nature of the pull we cannot say. So also we


cannot say how the mind and body interact, all we can say is

that they do interact. We know this to be true through experience.

The second of these difficulties is not nearly the difficulty that it is supposed to be. There is no reason to believe that the mind should add to or take away from the energy found in the physical realm. To say that the mind can direct the energy in the physical body is to say quite a different thing. "No reason of either an a priori or an empirical sort has as yet been suggested to show that in interaction between body and mind a transfer of physical energy would be necessary." 18

¹⁷ Pratt, PR, 263.

¹⁸ Pratt, PR, 261.




Thirdly, though consciousness is effected by bodily conditions, there is no reason to believe that it is caused entirely by the physical. In cases of actual aphasia where certain parts of the nervous system have been destroyed, it has been possible to educate other sections of the brain to do the work which had normally been done by the destroyed regions. Likewise rats have had sections of their brains removed, and it has been found that they can be re-educated, by the education of other parts of the brain, so as to perform normally. Even the dependence of habits upon specific neural paths is becoming doubtful. "The conclusion that seems to be emerging is that the brain works largely as a whole; and that the different parts of the mind live, but are, rather, tools which the unitary being, the psyche, uses,..."19

The fourth difficulty is only a difficulty to those who do not accept the reality of the self. If the conception of mind be vague it would be difficult to see how it might be a thing which could interact with the body, or the brain; but if it is looked upon as a unified self, then it is easier to see how it could have sufficient identity to interact with the body. The relation of the body to the self is a unique relationship. It can be verified only through experience. 20

¹⁹ Pratt, PR, 256-57.

²⁰ Pratt, PR, 269.



After having refuted the foregoing arguments, Professor Pratt's whole argument is empirical. He says the only way we can know that the self interacts with the body is through experience. We know through experience that the self acts upon the body and the body acts upon the self.


What we actually live through and immediately realize is a self acting in various ways and having various experiences: a self, or subject, or psyche, perceiving, conceiving, thinking, hoping, feeling, deciding, acting.

When the self acts upon the outer world it acts by means of its body. The relation is very close, but as I have pointed out in another connection, it would be a mistake to make the relation between the self and its body so intimate as to identify them or assert that the body is a part of the mind or self. . . 21

The hypothesis of interaction becomes increasingly important as it is applied to the universe as a whole. The mind-body problem is limited to the question of the relation of the human mind to the human body. However, Professor Pratt believes that the ultimate nature of the whole universe is very much like the relation between the human mind and body. The universe is a dualism of process. 22 Interaction of mind and matter then is a basic principle throughout the whole universe. This will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter under the sub-heading: Interaction of the mind and body of God. Interaction is the thread which makes unity possible with a dualism.

²¹ Pratt, PR, 267.

²² Pratt, PR, 272.



CHAPTER IV

THE SPIRITUAL PANTHEISM OF J. B. PRATT

Professor Pratt classifies the philosophies of the world into five principal hypotheses concerning the nature of the world:

"(1) Materialistic Naturalism, (2) Dualistic and Atheistic

Pluralism, (3) Deism or Transcendental Theism and the conception of the Finite God, (4) Spiritual Pantheism, and (5) Absolute

Idealism."

He discards the first two as being impossible and absolutely incoherent hypotheses. The last three are accepted as being quite possible, being consistent within themselves, and taking into account all the experiences of life.


I. THE SELECTION OF HYPOTHESES

Materialistic Naturalism. Materialists have been unable to agree on one fundamental point. Some materialists assert that consciousness and bodily correlation are identical; others, that they are separate factors, but that all mental content and activity is completely determined by bodily conditions.

Consciousness can never affect the body. Matter is always the cause; consciousness can never be the cause. "Naturalism insists that physical causation determines all events."

¹ Pratt, PR, 354.


² Pratt. PR. 357.



Therefore purpose can never act as a cause. The mind has no influence on the body, it is merely a phenomenon of the bodily process. Those who can not accept materialism as a dogmatic faith and who accept coherence as verification of truth, acknowledge that such a hypothesis is not at all in keeping with the everyday experience of human life. Human beings plan and carry out their plans. Men establish or accept purposes which they endeavor to attain throughout their lives. Likewise when it comes to the question of the origin and the ultimate reality of the universe, materialism cannot explain its development. Materialism looks at the long sequence of events maintaining that each previous event was the cause of the one following. But this is a supposition. The actual fact is only a sequence of events. If man grew out of the universe, then the universe is the kind of a universe that produced man. This qualifies the universe as being something more than a purely material and mechanical system of purely physical causation; for man is more than just physical. Thus materialistic naturalism is disqualified in the selection of a hypothesis. 3

Dualistic and Atheistic Pluralism. This hypothesis does not have quite as many difficulties as did the first; but although avoiding the materialistic naturalist's conception, it

³ See Pratt, MAS, 46-47; Pratt, APR, 78-102; Macintosh, RR, 41-44; and Brightman, ITP, 232-34.




is maintained that life plays a very small part in the universe, and that there is no universal purpose. There are at least two kinds of beings in the world, material objects and finite conscious creatures. There is possibly a third, organic but unconscious beings. The world is an aggregation of matter and energy. Interaction is accepted, thus accounting for the experience of human purpose; but that there is any universal purpose is denied. They make no endeavor to account for the origin of life or the physical world, or at best say that life developed out of the physical order of the universe. Thus this hypothesis becomes scarcely a hypothesis at all; it is hardly a coherent description of the phenomenal world. Likewise it must fall by the wayside.

Deism or Transcendental Theism and the conception of the Finite God. This is not one hypothesis, but two.

Professor Pratt should at least make a greater distinction between the two even though he does not accept either of them. The difference between Deism and the Finite God is far greater than the difference between Spiritual Pantheism and the Finite God. The Deist maintains that God is completely transcendent. The Theist of the Finite God holds the conception that God is both immanent and transcendent. Professor Pratt objects to transcendence on the basis that dualistic reelism requires that

⁴ Pratt, PR, 356.

⁵ Pratt, PR, 354.



God be immanent, for only thus can God's purposes be made causal. The purposes of God can only be rade efficient through a relationship of mind and matter which is like that of the human mind and body. If interaction is the only way for purpose to be made efficient, then God must be immanent to be efficient.


As the modern concept of causation, leads us to conceive of the universe as an organic whole, a network of relations and of parts sensitive to and mutually influencing each other, so an exemination of purpose and the meaning of its efficiency points to the conclusion that, if the world be really teleological, the relation between the cosmic purpose and the cosmic process must be analogous to that between a self and its body.

The difficulty in seeing how purpose can be efficient except in immanent fashion is only one of the obstacles which make it hard to accept either Deism or a Theism which depicts God wholly or chiefly in transcendent terms. . . 6

At this point Professor Pratt drops the argument against the transcendence of God, and with a method of more or less wishful thinking strikes at the conception of the Finite God.

But the Theism of the Finite God, as presented by certain schools of Christian theology, and as defended by William James, certainly makes a strong appeal to the moral sense and throws down a thrilling challenge to the man in each of us. So strong is this appeal that for many years to come -- possibly to the end of human history -- it will have a considerable following. Much, moreover, of a theoretical sort can be said in its favor. I have too much respect for it and for

⁶ Pratt, PR, 371.




many who cherish it, to subject it here to serious criticism. But I am bound to say that, for me, and I think, for very many people, belief in it is becoming steadily more difficult. "a god down in the dirt" as James used to call him, a power among other powers, conscious of an indifferent or hostile environment, a struggling, often thwarted God, who has noble aims, uses various means to achieve them, yearns for a better world, and who may eventually with our aid realize his glorious hopes, -- t is is not the kind of explanation of our universe that the intellect seeks, nor is it the Determiner of Destiny which our religious nature demands. 7

This whole objection seems to be largely "wishful thinking." He admits that it is theoretically sound, yet his conception of the virtue of all powerfulness turns his mind. So It seems only fair to the hypothesis of the finite God to ask a few questions regarding this unfounded rejection. It might be asked if a conception of an all powerful god who in his spontaneous activities, -- like a big play boy amused with himself -- with but little consideration for humanity, is the "Determiner of Destiny which our religious nature demands?" "hich does our religious nature demandmost, a belief that God is all powerful and inclined to wildness; or a belief that though he is working against necessary situations involving evil for some of humanity, yet he is a God of good purposes and of sufficient power to keep progressing in spite of evil. The question might also be asked if the intellect seeks that

⁷ Pratt, PR, 372. Cf. Brightman, FG, 13 and 166-193.

⁸ Cf. Wright, SPR, 396.




of which it has no possibility of knowing? The intellect certainly does not seek to establish its own ignorance. The intellect seeks to understand God and the universe. Any explanation which appeals to our ignorance of God's purposes and values does not satisfy a seeking intellect.

Professor Pratt in his earlier work Mind and Spirit, in a similar way begs the question. He says that personal idealism can be constructed only upon two bases: some form of panpsychism or the Kantian theory of knowledge. He says both are unsafe. He quotes Perry's figure, "once the Kantian theory of knowledge is accepted, personal idealism is on a slippery inclined plane with the Absolute waiting at the bottom." Then he proceeds to delight in drawing a picture of this steep slippery plank with a crocodile waiting at the bottom with jaws extended already for the pathetic figure of the personal idealist. Such question begging can hardly be taken seriously.

In the consideration of Professor Pratt's rejection of
the Finite God there seems to be no reason why he should have
to reject the hypothesis for any coherent reasons. The Finite
God is just as coherent with dualistic realism, as his
conception of God. It may be true that a transcendent God would
not be coherent with his hypothesis of the interaction of mind
and body from the realistic point of view, but there is no rational

⁹ Pratt, MAS, 214-15.



reason apparent in his discussion which makes it impossible to accept the idea of the Finite God. This rejection seems to be largely a personal predisposition.

Absolute Idealism. Continuing now with the five principle hypotheses, Absolute Idealism and Spiritual Pantheism are left as possible choices. Absolute Idealism is the hypothesis that God not only knows about everything, but that He literally shares the experience of His finite parts. 10 God is the sum total of all being and all experience. The difficulty with this hypothesis is that selves are not divisible. How can the sum of all the experiences of human selves be God's experience? The experience of a self can not be the experience of another self or of God. 11


I consider Absolute Idealism of the sort which completely identifies finite consciousness with the Absolute's consciousness, quite untenable. . . . The human experiences of ignorance, of wonder, of finitude, of defeat, are such that in the very nature of the case they could not be shared by an All-Knower who had presented to him the answer to every question, an Infinite Mind whose Will (so far as one may attribute Will to him) was eternally satisfied. 12

Though the Absolute Idealist might say that God is not eternally satisfied, there would still be lacking any real explanation as to how finite experience could become a part

¹⁰ Hocking, MGHE, 573.

¹¹ Pratt, PR, 373.

¹² Pratt, PR, 373. Cf. Pratt, APR, 113-124.



of the Infinite experience. A self is indivisible. Matter may be divided into parts, but selves are not divisible. A self is a whole, an indivisible unit. Thus Professor Pratt, it must be admitted, does have a coherent reason for not accepting Absolute Idealism in its usual form. However, it will be found that he accepts much of Absolute Idealism in a moderated form in his Spiritual Pantheism. He finally accepts the Cosmic Self as the Mind of the universe, and the physical universe is its body. Finite bodies are a part of the infinite body, but the finite selves are separate individuals and are no part of the Cosmic Self. It may be reasonably doubted whether such a conception can be rightly called a pantheism, for the finite self is not a part of the Absolute, and a distinction is made between the Cosmic Self and his body. Professor Fratt's chief reason for calling it a pantheism seems to be his conception of the organic unity of the universe. The next section of this chapter will be devoted to the metaphysics of this World Soul.

II. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE WORLD SOUL

In the preceding section of this thesis it has been shown indirectly that emergent evolution gives us only a list of things as they appeared. Their history and their list are probably correct, but if they stop with the list and history, they have thrown no light on the extraordinary


things that they have described. The facts of emergent evolution seem to point toward the conclusion that the development of at least part of the universe has been largely directed by conscious purpose. Other world views trying to explain these facts have been considered and disposed of by Professor Pratt. In this section Professor Pratt's own hypothesis attempting to explain the evidence of purpose in the world will be expounded.

In speaking of purpose, no descriptions of the purposes attributed to God are intended here. That will be considered in the next section of this chapter; but here the chief concern is to establish the hypothesis of the Cosmic Self on the basis of the evidence of God's purposes in the world.

To deny that purposes are often causes is to involve oneself in all the difficulties, not to say absurdities, which make both Materialism and Parallelism essentially fantastic. 13

The Cosmic Self. If purposes are often causes then how are they causes? It might be suggested that the purpose is immanent in nature. It has even been suggested that the purpose was an "unconscious purpose;" but as Professor Pratt points out, an immanent purpose when it is thought of as an "unconscious purpose" is meaningless. "So long as we are using the English language let us realize that an 'unconscious purpose' is a contradiction in terms, and belongs in the realm

¹³ Pratt, PR, 360.



of round squares."14 Purpose must be conscious. Therefore, there must be a Cosmic Self, a World Soul, if there is purpose in the universe. These universal purposes can become causal only through some such process such as that which we find in the mind-body relation in human life.


The universe is an organic whole, every part of which is directly or indirectly sensitive to, dependent upon, and capable of influencing, every other part... Reality is no "block-universe," but full of infinite variety and constant change. It is temporal, not static, a beginningless and endless process in time. But it is not a fall or drive or blind rush of separate atoms: rather it is the development and play of a common and infinitely varied life. The purposiveness of this common life, manifested in all things, leads me to believe that it is a conscious life; and that the relation between it and the physical world is that intimate and unique relation which we find between our own conscious lives and bodies....15

The Cosmic Self is much more than just process.

Process cannot explain the continuous invention and origination of new forms of increasingly higher value. Such purpose and origination must be organic and must be the product of a Cosmic Self. However, Professor Pratt believes that the Cosmic Self does not plan ahead. His purposes are spontaneous and are made causal immediately.

The purposes of such a cosmic Mind must not be pictured after the manner of our thwarted and striving purpose. Nor are they of the sort attributed by the "design argument" to the finite God of non-immanent Theism. The Cosmic Self of my hypothesis does not plan

¹⁴ Pratt, PR, 365. Cf. Pratt, APR, 88-90; and Dotterer, PWS, 359.
15 Pratt, PR, 374-75.




and scheme, nor does He make use of means to bring about the ends He longs to achieve. There is no "faroff divine event toward which the whole creation moves." On the other hand, the purpose which seems to be present in Nature is not to produce "just this," nor can it be presented in any one stage of the world. The development, the production of new forms, which one finds in organic evolution, and presumably in cosmic evolution, is indeed evidence of inner purpose, and the purpose is not simply process as such. It is process in a fairly definite direction, the continuous invention and origination of forms of steadily higher value. 16

It is difficult to ascertain just what Professor Pratt means by purpose. In some places he says that all of God's activities are purposeful. Yet in other places he speaks of the spontaneity of God. One might question whether spontaneous activity could be purposeful. It seems that it would have to be "given." It might be purposive and yet not be purposeful. To be sure a purposive activity may be purposive because it serves a useful function; but to be purposeful it must have an aim, an intention, or a resolution. If Professor Pratt means that all of God's purposes are immediately efficient, it might be questioned as to whether they were purposes, or merely wills to action.

The physical world is not dead but living, and it is the body of God. All its activities are both causal and purposeful -- because in it, as in us, purposes are efficient, which means they are causes. It is my hypothesis that the purposes of the Cosmic Mind are completely efficient, as ours are not, and that all the activities of its body (which is the physical world) are purposive as well as causal (which is obviously not the case with the processes of our bodies).17

¹⁶ Pratt, PR, 375-76.

¹⁷ Pratt, PR, 375.



It would seem that Professor Pratt means that God has not ever held any long time purposes, all purposes being immediately realized in causality. His purposes being spontaneous are immediately realized. His activities are all very spontaneous. Apparently he has no distant purposes which he works toward. He is interested only in increasing varieties of beauty which are beyond the human understanding. These varieties of beauty might be referred to as transcendent values. They are values only to God; man can not appreciate them. These transcendent values will be discussed in the following section of the chapter. The question whether such purposes can be real purposes must be left also to be discussed in that section.

The Physical World the Body of God. The quotation immediately preceding, which has been employed to help clarify Professor Pratt's position as to the efficiency of God's purpose, also anticipates the present subject. As seen from the quotation, if the physical world is to be considered anything but the body of God, it would be impossible for Professor Pratt to explain the efficiency of purpose in the world. Purpose and causation are considered as the determining factors in the existential world only if purpose can act causally. Purpose has been considered as determination by the future; and causation determination by the past. Neither

events. Purpose to become a determining factor in the existential world must be able to act causally. If the theory of interaction be accepted as an actual solution to the mind-body problem, then purpose can act causally. But if the universal purposes are to act causally, we must first accept the hypothesis that the physical world is the body of God. The only possible way for interaction to take place between the purposes of God and the causal activities of the existential world -- between mind and matter -- is through a mind-body relationship or its equivalent. We see universal purposes acting causally in our experience of the universe. Therefore if we are to accept universal purpose as being causal in the world, we must accept the world as being the body of God.

Professor Pratt does not describe the body of God.

He says very little about the nature of the body of God,

apart from the general exposition of his realistic hypothesis.

The idea of the physical world being the body of God seems at

times to be little more than an illustration as to how the

World Soul can act upon the Physical World. Sometimes it is


put as a kind of analogy. The physical world is infinitely

so much larger and so different in appearance from our finite

bodies, that it should not be thought of as being identical

or even similar. But the purpose that it serves according to

Professor Pratt, is the same purpose that the finite body serves.




That is, God interacts with the physical world somewhat in the same way that a human being interacts with his body.

God's purposes become efficient in the world because the world serves as a medium for His activities. God's will is made efficient in his body the physical world, just as a human being's will is made efficient through his body. The relation of the physical universe to the Cosmic Self, is the same as that of the finite body to the finite self. The physical world is the body of God in the sense of the purpose it fulfils.

The physical world is not dead but living, and it is the body of God. All its activities are both causal and purposeful -- because in it, as in us, purposes are efficient, which means that they are causes. 18

However, Professor Pratt does make some distinction between the relation of the Cosmic Self and its body and the relation of the finite self and its body. The purposes of the Cosmic Mind are completely efficient, so that all the activities of its body are purposive as well as causal. It is this complete efficiency of purpose, which would make one wonder if what Professor Pratt would mean as being the purposes of the Cosmic Mind are really purposes, for if they are completely efficient could they possess any element of futurity. This question, as suggested before, will be taken up in more detail in the following section. But we should make it very evident now that this distinction is made between the body of the finite and the body of the Cosmic Self.

¹⁸ Pratt, PR, 375.



It is my hypothesis that the purposes of the Cosmic Mind are completely efficient, as ours are not, and that all the activities of its body (which is the physical world) are purposive as well as causal (which is obviously not the case with the processes of our bodies). 19


Interaction of the mind and body of God. Again the preceding topic has been an anticipation of the present.

These terms and relations are so closely related that it is difficult to discuss any one of them without bringing in all of the others, for they all work together as a great system.

The existence of one is dependent upon the existence of the other and vice versa.

As has been said before, purpose if it is to become a determining factor in the existential world must be able to act causally. The only way that purpose can act is through the interaction of the mind and body of God. If then, the theory of interaction be accepted as a solution to the mind-body problem, and the relationship of the mind and body of God be considered similar in this respect, then universal purposes can act causally. It is through the interaction of the Cosmic Mind and its body that all the activities of its body become purposive as well as causal. This is true of the universal mind-body relationship, while it is not true of the finite mind-body relationship; because, says Professor Pratt, the purposes of the Cosmic Mind are completely efficient, while

¹⁹ Pratt, PR, 375.



those of the finite mind are not. Yet the process of interaction of mind and matter is fundamentally the same as the interaction found in the mind-body relationship of the finite self.

This is a conclusion both unescapable and significant. If you deny such action of the self upon its body you deny the efficiency of purpose: and if you admit it, you must conclude that purposive action, so far as we ever know it or have any direct evidence of its existence, or are able in any way imaginatively to realize it, is always immanent. For what we refer to as the interaction of mind and body is not the evternal kind of action which one finds when one billiard ball hits another. The category under which the mutual influence of the self and its body should be conceived is not mechanical but much more like the biological. The union of the two is peculiarly intimate: they have somehow become organic to each other. 20


The universe is an organic whole, every part of which is directly or indirectly sensitive to, dependent upon, and capable of influencing, every other part... The purposiveness of this common life, manifested in all thin s, leads me to believe that it is a conscious life; and that the relation between it and the physical world is that intimate and unique relation which we find between our own conscious lives and our bodies. 21

III. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF

The origin of the finite self. Professor Pratt considers the universe a beginningless and an endless process in time, and makes no attempt to account for its origin. However, he does attempt a very brief account of the origin of the finite self. The account is entirely in the form of an analogy. It

²⁰ Pratt, PR, 370. Cf. Dotterer, FWS, 200-210.

²¹ Pratt, PR, 374-75.




is based upon the facts of emergent evolution, though its implications reach far beyond the factual realm. The finite self and body are very much like the Cosmic Self and its body in metaphysical nature, though they vary in degree of efficiency and various other aspects. This likeness makes it very probable that finite selves grew out of the infinite self. We cannot know the detailed process by which this was done, but we can be rather certain of the finite self's origin. At least it is a very tenable hypothesis, and there is nothing in it which is not consistent with the whole of Professor Pratt's hypothesis. The nature of the human self has been used as the basis for the hypothesis of the Cosmic Self. If the hypothesis of the Cosmic Self for they both possess that unique characteristic of self-hood.

We as selves grow out from the universal life, in somewhat the same mysterious or simple fashion in which buds, in the springtime, grow out from the twigs and branches of the trees. The World itself is soul and body, and both our souls and our bodies grow quite naturally out of it. The details of the process are unknown to us; but if one adopts the general principles of causation and efficient purpose suggested in this volume, I do not see that there is any special difficulty in this derivation of the individual selves. 22

The nature of the finite self. Euch has already been said regarding the parallel activities of the finite self and body and the Cosmic Self and body; but little has been


²² Pratt, PR, 382.



said about the metaphysical nature of the self. The materialist will acknowledge no reality of the self. The self, as a materialist sees it is nothing more than a phenomenal consequence or the result of the physical functioning of the body. But the idealists and dualistic realists, and perhaps some ps chologists, agree that the self is much more than this, that it is an independent reality. Perhaps created by God, but having freedom, the self may be considered an independent reality. "... There is in the self a non-rational existential aspect which can never be reached by conceptual description and which can be realized only by intuition..."23 Professor Pratt says again, that we may know the self, but that we can only know it through experience. We cannot scientifically describe the self; but through experience we are certain of its existence. It seems unreasonable that any philosopher can deny the reality of the subject which does the denying.

There are chiefly two conceptions of the nature of the self. Some forms of idealism identify the self with consciousness. Others have various forms of soul theories. Professor Pratt considers the self as a substance. The self is characterized by passing sense, but this is a relatively unimportant matter. These are only part of the activities of the self.

²³ Pratt, PR, 315.



The self is a substance. We have considerable knowledge about it, and a certain immediate realization of it. It is not a blank and abstract substance nor a blank unity, but a substance with qualities, a unity that possesses rich variety. These qualities or characters and this variety are seen in the conscious states of the self and in its activities. It is characterized by its passing sensa — a relatively unimportant matter — by its memories, its tendencies, its activities, its powers or potentialities for action, its efforts of attention and will, its reasoning power, its sentiments, its purposes. 24


The individuality of the self. Professor Pratt calls his hypothesis Spiritual Pantheism; however, he does not imply that one self can be a part of another self, or that a finite self can be a part of the Cosmic Self. Matter is divisible into parts, but a self is indivisible. The self never loses its identity in a social group. The self never loses its identity in its union with the Cosmic Self. "Consciousness of union involves consciousness of difference."25

If the pantheistic view here presented be incompatible with the reality and the relative independence of the self, I shall without hesitation modify it, or even give it up. But I do not see that the two views are fundamentally inconsistent. For the Over-soul I have sought to present is not a Vedantic Brahma nor a Roycean Absolute. Our experiences are not conceived as being identical parts of its experience. Our minds are not identical parts of its mind, though certainly our bodies are parts of its body.... Matter is divisible into parts: mind is not.... Minds do not have parts, nor can different minds be combined so as additively to compose a new one.26

²⁴ Pratt, PR, 315-16.

²⁵ Pratt, PR, 382.


²⁶ Pratt, PR, 380. Cf. Pratt, APR, 138-140.



The metaphysical possibilities of immortality. Throughout Professor Pratt's hypothesis is seen the dualism of mind and body. This dualism of process is found both in the universe and in man. Man seems to be pulled between his physical limitations and his highest mental aspirations. He is comparatively a free thinking being, yet he is also somewhat subject to the limitations of his physical body. The question of immortality has been one of long standing. Though man is a comparatively free thinking being, will he continue his existence after his physical body ceases to function? Body is not mind nor self, and self is not body. But will the mind, the self, continue on without the body? The self possesses a considerable degree of independence of the body which seems to increase with increasing age. There is no a priori justification for the denial of the self surviving a bodily death. Part of the conscious life is dependent on both self and body, but other parts of the psychic life are obviously not dependent upon the body. Facts of clairvoyance and telepathy are evidence of the latter.

More significant is the steadily increasing probability of the reality of telepathy and supernormal knowledge. Investigations by many scientific workers that have been carried on now for many years have piled up a mass of factual evidence for clairvoyance, telepathy, and kindred phenomena which I, for one, cannot pass over as negligible.... The most natural conclusion to draw from the acceptance of this view is that in certain situations selves are able to influence each other without the intervention of cerebral or other bodily means....27

²⁷ Pratt, PR, 350.



Professor Pratt's metaphysics, allowing an increasing amount of independence to the self, makes way for at least a fond hope that man is not through here. 28

For on this hypothesis the Over Soul is the source of our spirits; and it might well be also in Augustine's phrase, "the goal of our pilgrimage, and our resting place by the way." Nor would it be unreasonable to suppose that He has made us for Himself, and that our hearts are, therefore, restless till they rest in Him. 29


IV. THE PURPOSES OF THE COSMIC ARTIST

Transcendental values. Perhaps the greatest problem that confronts any pantheism is the problem of evil. If God is a good God and at the same time an Almighty God, his purposes being completely efficient in the world; how can the existence of evil be accounted for? Though evil is not only a problem to pantheism, but likewise a fact of experience that all philosophies of religion must explain, it is more of a problem to pantheism, for pantheism, identifying God with the whole universe, identifies God with evil.

Professor Pratt solves this problem by saying that these things which appear as evil to human beings are not evil in God's experience. God has purposes which man cannot know. God lives in such an entirely different perspective that human values become insignificant when contrasted with the greater values of the whole.

²⁸ Cf. Pratt, RC, 225-254.

²⁹ Pratt, PR, 383. Cf. Pratt, APR, 209-220.



His life is full of finite death, his delight includes sorrow and anguish; endless spontaneity and immeasureable contrasts, pleasure and pain, stars and the sweep of systems, the terror of the storm as well as the calm of the June day, wildness, cold, darkness, joy, -- all these are actualities in His nature; but so united, it may be, that were our minds great enough to comprehend them together, we should find in the Whole an overwhelming and unspeakable beauty, a beatific vision. 30


This confused picture of the extreme forms of human experience leads the reader to consider God either as being irresponsible and wild, or to consider ourselves as being ignorant of his purposes. Professor Pratt chooses the latter, which however, also implies the former. The reader is almost led to believe that God scarcely has any purpose in human life whatsoever. Professor Pratt, in his conclusion, considers the question and turns it over to religion as an impossible problem for philosophy.

Clearly the Cosmic Self suggested in our discussion eternally creates what are for Himself the highest values. It will be asked, Does he create values for us also? And this question, I suppose, is one with the question whether He has "made us for himself." I do not know whether philosophy can answer. Religion can and does. And if philosophy is unable to make here any positive assertion, I do not see how it can forbid the conviction of both Buddhism and Christianity that insight and love are at the very heart of Being. 31

Professor Pratt turns the problem over to religion leaving room for God's interest in mankind, but much that he said preceding seemed quite skeptical at this point.

³⁰ Pratt, PR, 379-380.

³¹ Pratt, PR, 384. Cf. Pratt, APR, 203.



But here as elsewhere, the true appreciation of beauty must be disinterested. Too often in the past beauty, as well as goodness, of the Lord has been veiled and distorted by an attempt to identify it with an imagined exclusive care for us human darlings. 32


If God be the World Soul there is an element of wildness in Him not recognized in the usual picture of "Our Heavenly Father." Even in such excellent and recent books as the able treatises by Dr. Tennant and Archbishop Temple, the figure of God that emerges retains a little too much of the glorified clergyman. 33

If Professor Pratt's conception of God's values as being beyond man's perspective is to be accepted, then the problem of evil is solved. Evil then becomes only a relative matter among human beings. There are no eternal values which have any significance to man. God's purposes almost totally, if not entirely, transcend even the highest values conceived by man.

To say the least, it is interesting to compare Professor Pratt's view of the transcendent values of God with his view of God's entirely immanent existence in the universe. It must be admitted that the contrast is lessened by allowing for the separate existence of the finite selves. But even so does not the immanence of God in human physical bodies as well as in all their physical environment suggest that He must be conscious of the existence of man as a free being. If so, it seems that God would recognize a free being as having significance which

³² Pratt, PR, 378.

³³ Pratt, PR, 379.




supersedes the significance of His own body, the physical world which is subject to His will. Furthermore, completely transcendent values and free selves are incompatible, because it is not consistent to believe that free selves who could act upon the body of God would or could be totally disregarded by God. God would have to acknowledge their free nature and have a conception of value regarding them.

As Professor Pratt pictures God, God is not a social being, but a lonely artist who is creating and acting upon values which are to His own taste and real only to Himself.

Man is ignorant of God's values. This implies that Man's values are only relative. That which is seen as evil by man is not necessarily evil to God. Thus God can be completely immanent in the physical universe and still be absolutely good, for man knows nothing about God's goodness.

Such an appeal to the ignorance of value as a means of solving the problem of evil should not go by unchallenged. Professor Pratt does not commit himself definitely to meny of the implications of his conception of God; but this much can be said very definitely that the quotations in this section of this thesis imply definitely that God is not as interested in man as has been supposed, and that man is ignorant of God's values. It has already been pointed out that the transcendence and freedom of the finite self is not consistent with the conception that God would not be interested



in that self. The fact that the self is free and transcends God should make the self more prominent in God's experience than the physical universe which does not transcend God and which is subject to his will.

Furthermore, to appeal to human ignorance of God's values undermines the whole basis for knowledge. Even the simple admission that the problem of evil is unsolved does not do this. To say that God's values completely transcend human experience implies that all human values are relative even including the value of truth. If truth is relative, can one appeal anymore to reason and to coherence than to wishful thinking or intuition? However, to admit the unsolved problem of evil, or to offer another solution which does not appeal to the necessary ignorance of man, is to continue to trust the resources of the human mind in its interpretation of human experience. Such a trust is essential to any knowledge beyond the realm of the scientific data of experience.

As has been noticed earlier in this thesis, Professor

Pratt, in a mood of rather wishful thinking and with no


attempt at coherent argument, degrades the idea of a finite

God. 34 It is well to call attention here again to the contrast

of the two ways of solving the problem of evil. Professor

Pratt pictures God as a God who is uninterested in man and

³⁴ Pratt, PR, 372 and Pratt, MAS, 214-15.



who has values which are not understandable by man and are not concerned with man. The conception of the finite God pictures God as a God who though striving successfully against necessary odds, is primarily interested in the welfare of man and has values which are understandable by man and concern man. Professor Pratt's conception sacrifices the element of goodness for the element of all-powerfulness and all-being. The conception of the finite God sacrifices the elements of all-powerfulness and all-being sufficiently to allow for goodness.

It is interesting to notice that though Professor

Pratt takes much pain to keep God's interests and values all

above the level of man, nevertheless, in the end he says that


it would not be unreasonable to suppose that God has made

us for Himself.

For on this hypothesis the Over Soul is the source of our spirits; and it might well be also, in Augustine's phrase, "the goal of our pilgrimage, and our resting place by the way." Nor would it be unreasonable to suppose that He has made us for Himself, and that our hearts are, therefore, restless till they rest in Him. 35

It is not entirely just a matter of preference between the conception of the finite God and Professor Pratt's conception. The weaknesses of Professor Pratt's hypothesis in respect to the values of God have been pointed out. Where his hypothesis ends in the relativity of values and thus the


³⁵ Pratt, PR, 383. Cf. Macintosh, RR, 54.



relativity of the value of truth itself, the hypothesis of
the finite God not only is based upon coherence but strengthens
its own basis by making the basic human values eternal values.
Professor Pratt's conception leads to the undermining of the
coherence theory. The conception of the finite God leads to
the strengthening of this synoptic and systematic consistency
of reason.

From the practical point of view it should also be noticed that a worship and prayer of mutual fellowship between God and man would be impossible if Professor Pratt's hypothesis were true. It is true that man might worship the power and majesty of the all-powerful; but if God's interests are above the level of man, then man could not expect response to prayer in his own life. On the other hand, the conception of the finite God is not only more in harmony with coherence but it conceives of God as being interested in man and even of such a nature as to be interested in his fellowship and supplications.

The improvising God. Professor Pratt draws a musical analogy to the support of his idea of the ever complete and efficient purposes of God. He likens materialism and mechanism to music being played on a pianola the record of which was made entirely by chance. Deism he likens to a record being played on a pianola, the record having been




made by a distant composer. He compares traditional Theism to an artist playing from an already composed and written score of his own composition. He likens his own conception to a composer improvising.

The Spiritual Pantheism of my hypothesis is more like the composer improvising. There is here no careful working out of an arrangement long before planned, any more than there is a merely purposeless and predetermined mechanical operation. All is purpose but all is spontaneity. The new is ever entering in, the value desired is being ever achieved. Throughout the entire process is indeterminism and origination, yet the whole is a unitary and self-consistent whole, because it is the outpouring and self-expression of a single masterly Self. 36

Professor Pratt goes on to say that even in preference to this idea of the improvising composer, he likes the idea of the Cosmic Dancer which the Indians called the Dance of Shiva. This conception never has the Divine working, but always playing. God's activity is always sport. He does not need an instrument. He is his own instrument. He is motivated entirely by his own love of life and love of beauty.


It has been questioned previously in this chapter whether a purpose which was spontaneously and always spontaneously efficient could really be a purpose. Let us admit that purpose can be spontaneously efficient and still be purposeful. The fact that purpose can be immediately

³⁶ Pratt, PR, 376-77.



and completely efficient does not destroy its purposefulness. Yet even so, purposes to be purposes must have some value to tie to. Professor Pratt apparently recognizes this. He speaks of the value desired being ever achieved. However, Professor Pratt becomes very confusing here. If he means that God's values are all just his immediate desires, he has destroyed any sense of value beyond the short lived value of pleasure. If he means that God has a sense of values which are eternally his values, then in this sense at least there is an element of values transcending his own immediate experience.


It may well be agreed with Professor Pratt, that God probably has no one static goal which He is working toward; but to say that God has no goals which transcend his immediate experience is entirely another thing. To say this latter would indicate that God had no sense of the evil and suffering which much of humanity is going through, for no good God could be content if he knew of this suffering unless he was working to improve the situation, or saw the final outcome as an improved situation. To say that God has no goals which transcend his immediate experience is to say that God is entirely tied up in the satisfaction of his own immediate pleasures. Such a self would be almost on the same level as the lower animal life. If a highly developed personality is to be attributed to God; He must have a conception of values.



God may not have a static goal in the future; but to say that God has no goals transcending his own immediate experience is to say that God does not think, for thought transcends time. The meaning of the present is real only in reference to the past and to the future. Consciousness may exist with only the thought of the immediate present, but this consciousness lacks meaning and even lacks identity without reference to the past and without expectancy of a future. The very nature of a self is to possess an identity which does not change with the passing of time. 37 God is not a person unless he has developed reason and values which transcend the immediate present.


Even though consciousness may be directed very much toward the present; without reference to values which are lasting values or at least valuable in the future, all values of the present become meaningless. Pleasure may exist without thought of the future; but isolated pleasure with no thought of value has not intelligent value significance. Isolated pleasure must be recognized as only a temporary thing, unless it be related to all the values of a whole life. A self which follows nothing but the immediate pleasure motive does not think, but only experiences and exists on an animal plane of selfhood. Such a self could herdly be attributed to God.

³⁷ Brightman, ITP, 192.




Professor Pratt does not attribute such a nature to God. The picture that he paints of God is not a picture of an animal-like existence following a pleasure motive. It is a picture of austere beauty which comes forth as the ever fulfilling of the inner urge of His own love of life and love of beauty. If God is not a thinking being who can interpret value, and if man can not understand God's values, how is anyone to know whether the inner urges of God are the love of life and the love of beauty. And if that life and that beauty are not describable, how are they to be established as being values. If we are to accept God's values as being values, we must at least allow that he can intelligently consider them as values by the time transcending reference of thought. Apart from intelligence values have no significance. Apart from intelligence the love of life and the love of beauty can have no more significance than that of a feeling or a pleasure. Intelligence depends upon the time transcendence of thought. If God's thoughts, purposes, and activities are all in the immediate present, and there is no reference possible to anything transcending the immediate present; then intelligence cannot be attributed to God, and God can have no intelligent values, but must always act on the animal plane of feeling and pleasure. Such a conception of God is inconsistent with the conception of the "Determiner of Destiny," or the conception of the Cosmic Artist.

³⁸ Pratt, PR, 372.



In the analogy at the beginning of this sub-section on the improvising God, it was stated that Professor Pratt likened traditional Theism to an artist playing from an already composed and written score of his own composition. I doubt whether a personal idealist of today would accept such an analogy as being a fair representation of his conception of God. The conception of the finite God is quite contrary to such an analogy. Far be it from a matter of God's completely predetermining all of His activities. The conception of the finite God has God facing almost as much of a nonpredictable future as does Professor Pratt's conception of God. God has values which He cherishes for the future, though the future is by no means determined in any exact or specific way. God endeavors to realize more and more of his ideal values, and will in the end have greater perfection than he has now; but by no means is each activity previously planned or pondered over. God is a God of action, and yet he is a God who holds to unattained values and purposes. This likewise is far from being a static and fixed goal of the kind to which Professor Pratt objects. Nor is God necessarily a thwarted, pondering, contriving Cod. Yet He is a God who is facing the reality of his own limitations. He limits himself to the good and to consistent activity. He is a God who sees thinks in all perspectives, and who understands all points of view, and from this perspective of all perspectives He knows all. But




this does not mean that human knowledge is foreign to him, or that human beings are entirely ignorant of absolute truth and of ultimate values.

The wildness of God. Professor Pratt attributes to the Cosmic Self a disposition of being terrifying and austere as well as of being sweet and safe. If God is all powerful, almighty, the originator of all, then the only way to account for these other characteristics in the world is to attribute them to his personality. These characteristics look evil or terrible to us, but we may believe that if we could see them all as they fit together in God's perspective that they are beautiful.

If we are to take this "Spiritual Pantheism" seriously we must go the whole way with it. God is to be found not only in the sweet and safe, but in the austere and the terrifying as well. "The beauty of the Lord" is not in the little alone. We must be prepared to trace it in the overwhelmingly immense, and to believe it possible that there may be a transcendent beauty on a scale too large, and in a complication of detail too multiform, for our little minds, with their particular interests and instinctive fears, to grasp or to appreciate. If God be the World Soul there is an element of wildness in Him not recognized in the usual picture of "Our Heavenly Father." 39

This wildness of God, as attributed to Eim by Professor Pratt, is then, not necessarily wildness in God's perspective, but it appears as wildness to us because we can not see it in its real perspective. God's real beauty and interest is not


³⁹ Pratt, PR, 379.



meant to be appreciated by human beings, but by Himself.

God is more or less indifferent to human beings, and for
that reason some of His activities appear as wild to humanity.

It is God's indifference to man then, in Professor Pratt's
conception, that makes His values transcendent, and thus makes
Him appear to have an element of wildness in Him. The arguments
as set forth in the foregoing sub-section seem to prove that
if personality is to be attributed to God, He must have values
which are permanent and which are not entirely beyond the
appreciation of mankind. The following chapter summarizes
and concludes this and the foregoing problems.




CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS SUMMERIZED AND CONCLUDED

Throughout the foregoing chapters problems have been raised. Some of these problems have been solved, others have had to be left unsolved, and there are still other problems which were implied which likewise remain unsolved. This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) the problems implied, (2) the problems unsolved, and (3) the problems solved. By problems solved it is meant solved to the satisfaction of the writer of the thesis.


I. PROBLEMS IMPLIED

Is this Pantheism? The title of this last chapter,
Spiritual Pantheism, is the same title which Professor Pratt
prefers to use in maming his Weltenschauung. He refers to
this term opiritual Pantheism throughout his last chapter in
Personal Realism. The question being raised here is whether
such a world view which recognizes the separate reality of
selves and a dualism of mind and matter is really a pantheism.
Perhaps the dualism of mind and matter when conceived of as an
organic unity could be considered a pantheism; but if such
is the case much of the idea of the independent reality of
matter or of mind must be qualified. The main objection here
is that selves are wholes and they cannot be a part of another



a world view which recognizes the freedom and uniqueness of the self be called a pantheism? Pantheism is the belief that the universe in its totality is God. If Professor Pratt believes that human beings are not a part of God then his Weltanschauung is not a real pantheism. Even though he does consider the universe the body of God, the term pantheism is not the right term for designating his philosophy.


Is the idea of the immanent God consistent with the idea of independently real existents? Professor Pratt confesses a strong belief in each of these conceptions. He believes strongly that God is completely immanent in the universe, and yet he believes equally as strongly that the universe is an independent physical reality. He shows how the immanence of God is necessary to the idea of causation; but he also endeavors to establish the idea of the replity of the existential world. As seen from the forecoing chapters it is agreed that the physical world is real in human experience. It is also agreed that God is immanent in the universe. Put to say that the immanence of God in the universe does not qualify the nature of the physical universe is to deny largely the very arguments used to establish the conception of God and of God's relation to the universe. Thus if it is to be agreed that God is immanent in the universe, it seems that it must also be agreed



that the universe is not so independently and existentially real as a naive realism would lead one to believe. Thus it seems that if Professor Pratt is to accept both the complete immanence of God and the world of existents, he must qualify existents as being at least partly maintained by God, if not entirely posited and maintained by God.

Is the idea of the interaction of the mind and body of God consistent with the conception of the all powerfulness of God? Professor Pratt tells us that God is a Cosmic Self. A self is a substance of the nature of mind, but existentially real. The physical universe is the body of God, which is also existentially real. The physical universe is not God; it is only his body. Professor Pratt likewise in discussing the interaction of mind and body says that the process in the universal whole must be similar to that in the human being. "If the doctrine of Interaction in any of its forms be true, it would seem that we must acknowledge in the universe a dualism of process." We can readily see in the realm of human experience how mind influences matter and matter influences mind. It is also conceivable that the physical universe, God's body, might have an effect upon the Cosmic Self, as well as for the Cosmic Self to have affect upon its own body. But if all-powerfulness is to be attributed to the


¹ Pratt, PR, 272.



Cosmic Self, it could not be coherently maintained that the physical universe could affect the Cosmic Self. Thus it seems that if a complete hypothesis of interaction be carried into the metaphysical realm it is inconsistent with the idea of the all-powerfulness of God, for it would imply something acting upon or influencing God. If God is all-powerful, the physical universe could not cause any change in him; thus the physical universe would have to be only a tool to be used by God or a realm in which God could demonstrate his power. Or if the process of interaction is two way between two independent realities, mind affecting matter and matter affecting mind, then God is limited.

Is this a physical "Given"? The existence of an independent existential world which interacts with God, if one is to be coherent, must limit God's power. The physical could affect God as much as God could affect the physical. Professor Pratt in several places makes light of the conception of the finite God.² He makes light of the idea of a limited God or the idea of a "Given." It seems that if his own philosophy be carried to its logical and coherent conclusions he must acknowledge something which would be even more debasing to him than the conception he turns away from with disgust. If all-powerfulness is the greatest virtue of God, then to be limited by a physical "Given" is more lowering than to be limited by a logical "Given",

² Pratt, PR, 372 and Pratt, MAS, 214-15.




or any other kind of a "Given." Thus it seems that it becomes necessary either to give up the idea of the virtue of power or the process of interaction between God and the existential world, or to give up the whole hypothesis of dualistic realism. One or the other must be modified.

Personal idealism offers a way out of this problem.

If God is the creator of all that is real in human experience, if God posits and maintains the physical universe, then all the power of the physical universe originates in Him. Thus God would not be limited by a physical "Given." However, in order to explain the evil in the universe it would seem necessary to consider His power somewhat limited by some kind of a "Given."


If God's values transcend man's values, can man trust God? If God is not concerned with human beings, and has no values regarding man, but has only values which are beautiful and meaningful to Him, is God a kind of a God which human beings can trust? If God is not concerned with anyone but himself may we not expect almost as nuch chaos as in a world of accident? To be sure, there is much chaos about us; but there seems to be more order than chaos. Chaos would be meaningless if there were not sufficient order in the universe so that we could understand the significance of chaos. There is at least sufficient order in the universe to develor



persons capable of understanding at least some of the aspects of the universe. There has been sufficient consistency of objective human experience to develop a human personality and a human understanding of the world of experience.

A Cosmic Self which was not even conscious of other selves, and did not value the existence of other selves would not be sufficiently concerned over their welfare that they either should or could trust Him. If God is not interested in human beings and other life, the nature of the universe could not be any more trustworthy than the non-interest of a machine. The facts of experience show sufficient consistency of living beauty and goodness in the universe to refute the idea that God is not interested in human welfare. Perhaps God is disinterested in the sense that he is not interested in special individuals more than others; but to say that he is totally interested in affairs other than human life seems to be contrary to the facts of experience. Such a God could not be trusted.

Furthermore, if selves have a unique characteristic about them which makes them stand out as apart and different from all the rest of the universe, it is only coherent to believe that the Cosmic Self must be conscious of their existence and even must count them of more value as a whole than the physical universe, eventhough it be His body. So also God must use the physical universe to further the ends




of these other selves as well as any personal values which He might have. If the physical universe is His will, then this is even more coherent. Unless God's personal values are of the same nature as the highest values man knows, His trustworthiness would be doubtful.

II. PROBLEMS UNSOLVED

The correspondence theory of truth: is it truth? As with all of these unsolved problems, the main arguments are given in the foregoing chapters. Here the purpose is to briefly summarize and state the problem as it stands. It has been acknowledged that the correspondence theory of truth states what truth is, but it fails to make any verification of truth. Professor Pratt claims that it needs no verification. However, it seems necessary to have some method of testing whether the judgment does correspond with the object. Thus it must be verified by its coherence. Coherence includes all the various other tests of truth, contributing in addition a unique aspect by making a systematic and synoptic consistency the ultimate test of all truth. As for the correspondence theory of truth it can only be said that it is a definition of truth; it is not a criterion of truth. Though Professor Pratt uses coherence as a test for truth in the realm of essence, he denies that such is necessary in the realm of existents.

Is matter an independent reality? This question has been rather dominant throughout the thesis. It is a question of historical standing. Though Professor Pratt holds steadfastly to the idea of the reality of the existential world, it seems that many of the qualities and relationships which he attributes to the realm of the physical imply the need for considerable modification and qualification. The conception of the immanence of God makes it necessary to modify and qualify the meaning of the existential world. Likewise the idea of the independent reality of the physical world tends to come into conflict with the idea of an allpowerful God. Many other elements have been pointed out which make it necessary to admit that the physical world would not be the same without the immanence of God and that in this sense at least God must be a part of the real or the continued originator of the real. The existential world must be dependent upon God for its existence. Yet, it must be agreed that in the realm of experience the existential world is real. This problem will probably always continue to be a problem as long as realism is held as a philosophical hypothesis. It would be foolish to try to classify it as a solve problem. However, before realism can be accepted it must be verified. verification thus far seems to be impossible. All attempts to establish a dualistic realism have thus far led to a more or less a priori acceptance of the hypothesis without verification.



Is God entirely immanent in the world? Professor

Pratt not only considers the world as the body of God, but

says that God is entirely immanent in the world. There is

no aspect of God which transcends the physical universe. It

seems quite evident through the many arguments of causation


and purpose that God must be immanent in the world. But to

say that there is no aspect of his personality which transcends

the world is quite another assertion.

Professor Pratt's conception of the complete immanence of God is in good harmony with his idea of the spontaneity and complete efficiency of all of God's thoughts. For if all of God's thoughts are made acts immediately, then the physical world is the complete expression of all of God's thoughts. God would have no thoughts which were not expressed in the universe; thus there would be no transcendent aspect. But to say that all of God's thoughts are completely efficient is to deny to God any of the powers of reflection and reason. Furthermore, purposes imply values which must have an element of futurity in them; thus it seems that if God is a God of values and purposes He must have an element of reflection and reason in his nature. Such an element would deny the complete spontaneity and efficiency of all of God's thoughts, and would demand an aspect of transcendence. This depends partly upon

³ Pratt, PR, 375.




the nature attributed to the self. If the Cosmic Self is the sum total of all His experience, then in so far as He has experiences which transcend the phenomenal realm, so far He is also transcendent to the phenomenal universe.

Are God's purposes entirely spontaneous? Professor Pratt seems to glory in the idea that God is so all-powerful that His mind is never bothered with anything particularily serious in nature. God has purposes but they are so quickly achieved that God does not even have to think about them. "All is purpose but all is spontaneity. The new is ever entering in, the value desired is being ever achieved."4 It appears that Professor Pratt's conception of God is something like some of our modern psychologist's conceptions of a healthy man being the man who does not have anything to worry about, or who has no serious problems to face, so that he is never thwarted by facing serious obstacles. Perhaps the man without heavy responsibilities, or who never thinks about a serious problem is more carefree; but as for the value of the man, I think most people would trust the man who had faced obstacles and overcame them rather than the man who had never faced a hardship in all his life.

If Professor Pratt's conception of the spontaneous and completely efficient purposes of God be accepted, the evidence of the evil and chaos in the world is to derogate the moral

⁴ Pratt, PR, 377.




nature of God. At least most idealists will agree that a somewhat thwarted God is preferable to a non-moral God or a God who has morals which are not concerned with man, or any of the selves which have grown out of Him or been developed by Him.

Are transcendent values of value to man? If God has no values concerning man, but has values which only concern Himself and which can only be appreciated by Himself; do these values have any significance to man? With a God of such values does the universe promise any more security to man than materialism or mechanism? It seems quite evident that if God is less conscious of human values than man is of the values of ants, and if God is still less concerned, human beings cannot expect much security from such a God. With a God like this they could only fear and tremble in his constant presence, and could not even plead for mercy.

The transcendence of God's values are implied very definitely by Professor Pratt. Though he uses the term very little and then mostly in speaking of transcendent beauty⁵, he speaks definitely of God's having values which human beings cannot appreciate. He also speaks of God's having little care for human beings.⁶ Yet in another

⁵ Pratt, PR, 379.

⁶ Pratt, PR, 378.



place Professor Pratt discusses the question: "Has human life any purpose, and if so, what is it?" Here he makes room for the possibility of cosmic purpose in human life.


If there be anything of cosmic purpose in human life, part of that purpose is the education and development of the self. It may be "we are born at all adventure"; but if there be any larger significance in our lives, it must be that we human souls have value and are worth perfecting, and that it is for this we are here. 7

Even here Professor Pratt leaves his position very skeptically. As for his final solution of the problem, it can only be said that he leaves it dangling between the seeming goodness and beauty and the austere and terrifying in the universe. He seems to be more doubtful than hopeful on the question as to whether God sees any value in man. It seems necessary to add here that without the Cosmic Self's concern for human beings and without values which are mutually appreciated, there is but little more hope in Professor Pratt's conception than in Naturalism.

However, Professor Pratt does not seem to consistently maintain that God is interested or is disinterested in mankind. In places he seems to be quite skeptical; yet in other places he seems to be much more hopeful. He finally turns the whole question over to religion, and says that it is very possible that God may have made us for Himself.⁸

⁷ Pratt, PR, 351-52.


⁸ Pratt, PR, 383.



Is the self a substance? Though Professor Pratt's conception of a self's being a substance has significance, there are various elements about it which are rather vague and indefinable. It may be agreed that his argument for the existence of the self is well expounded, and the personal idealist will heartily agree that the self is a reality; but to merely say that a self is a substance of a unique type bearing unique qualities is not to say very much about its nature.9 To say that it is an existent which is non-spatial but yet possessing qualities, describes it but little better. It seems that it would be more consistent with Professor Pratt's empirical method for him to identify it with consciousness; but he raises several objections to this. The primary objection is that consciousness seems too fragmentary, vanishing with sleep or unconsciousness, and even possessing states of varying degrees of alertness in the waking hours. However, with all of these weaknesses it seems that the idea of consciousness comes much more nearly describing the experience of the self than does the idea of a substance.

The nature attributed to the self has many metaphysical implications; so it is little wonder that this too must remain an unsolved problem. The conception of the self as a substance gives a much better foundation for the whole realistic theory.

⁹ Pratt, PR, 301.




III. PROBLEMS SOLVED

The writer of the thesis considers the following problems solved to his own satisfaction. He acknowledges that to assert these problems solved for all philosophers would be contrary to fact and a dogmatic assumption.

Mind is a reality. Whether or not it can be agreed that the self is a substance, it can pretty thoroughly be agreed that mind is a reality. To begin with mind is presupposed by any attempt at thought, understanding, or knowledge. Not only is it the presupposition of all thinking, but it is very evident in every experience. Every experience has a subject. The subject is the "I" or the "ego" which is playing a part in all experience. To deny the reality of the self and of the mind is to deny the reality of the denier. To say that such an evident reality does not exist is absurd and makes any attempt at knowledge impossible.

Epistemological dualism is essential to knowledge. In the knowing process there must always be a subject and an object. The subject is the thinking self; the object is the thing thought about. Both are essential to thinking and to knowing. The epistemological object should not be confused, however, with the ontological object. They are not the same thing. The epistemological object may be characteristic of the




ontological object; but it can not be coherently proved to be identical. Many illusory sense experiences serve as evidence that this knowledge of the existential world is always indirect. The epistemological subject and object are distinctly two different things.

The self is indivisible. One self can be no part of another self. Though there is some uncertainty as to the exact nature of the self, there is a general agreement among those who recognize the reality of the self that it is unique and indivisible. Finite selves cannot be parts of the Cosmic Self, nor can they become parts of other finite selves.

Selves are wholes, which can neither be divided into other selves or become parts of other selves.

Interaction of mind and body. Mind and body must interact. This is the only coherent explanation which really accounts for the experience of human action and sense experiences. Other systems fail to explain these experiences except by making them entirely illusory. Parallelism implies a lack of human freedom, is not consistent with the facts of experience, and thus must be discarded. Other theories make mind entirely a product of matter. Interaction then is left as the only theory which coherently explains the facts of experience. To the personal realist it is the interaction of mind and matter, but to the personal idealist it is the interaction of the mind of the finite self with the will or mind of God.




The Cosmic Self. If it be granted that there is evidence of purpose operating in the universe which is other than human purpose, the only coherent explanation is that there must be a Cosmic Self. A purpose implies a purposer. Likewise cause is inexplainable except through the interaction of mind and matter, which implies the reality of a Cosmic Self. These are Professor Pratt's main arguments. The personal idealist would say that cause is inexplainable without a God to will that cause. Going on with the arguments, if one accepts the fact that mind is a reality and that it is a reality in the universe apart from man or other finite selves, then there must be a Cosmic Self; for mind cannot exist by itself apart from a self. The mind of the universe must be the mind of the Sosmic Self. The personal idealist believes God to be the source of everything, and in a sense to be all the universe except for the independent selves to whom he gave an independent will of their own. God is a self; the universe is His will, an aspect of His mind, in a sense perhaps His body.

The Cosmic Self is the origin of the finite self. It is generally agreed by those who believe in the reality of the self and the Cosmic Self that the finite self must be an outgrowth from the Cosmic Self or the creation of the Cosmic Self. The development of the finite self has been traced by emergent evolution. This is the tracing of the probable sequence

of facts. At the origin and behind that development must be the causation of the Cosmic Self. Though the finite self has its origin in the Cosmic Self, it must not be mistakenly taken as a part of the Cosmic Self, for it is a separate self.

The physical world is related to the Cosmic Self.

Professor Pratt makes this relation of the physical universe to God analogous to the relation of the human body to the human self. He definitely speaks of the universe as the body of God. In reference to the relationship of the two and to the function of the physical universe it must be generally agreed that there is a very similar relationship. It would be altogether too crude, however, to carry this analogy to the extreme by attempting to make it similar in form. The personal realist will consider the body of God metaphysically real matter. The personal idealist may also consider the world in a sense the body of God, but it is not metaphysically matter. To the personal idealist it is the will, mind, or experience of God, made real in both His experience and in human experience.




SUMMARY

The first problem that anyone must solve in the search for truth is the criterion for truth. What is truth? How can one find the truth? What are the prerequisites for finding the truth? How can truth be verified?

There are two main sources of all knowledge. One is the source of sense experience and the other is the source of reason. Philosophers have sometimes maintained that truth can only be found through experience. Others have said that truth can only be found through reason. Others have used both experience and reason as a way to truth. Professor Pratt believes that truth can be found through both experience and reason; but experience is probably the most important. He is more of an empiricist than a rationalist.

The correspondence theory of truth is the extreme form of empiricism. Truth is defined as the correspondence of a judgment with its object. Professor Pratt says that in the realm of existents no verification of this correspondence is necessary.

The criticism of this theory is that though this is a definition of what truth is, it cannot be said to be true until the correspondence of the judgment with the object is verified. Professor Pratt says that it needs no verification. He admits that truth in other realms should be subjected to




the test of coherence, but in the realm of the experience of the existential no such test is necessary. The truth of the correspondence theory of truth depends entirely upon the a priori acceptance of the independent reality of the existential world. The realistic hypothesis and the correspondence theory of truth are postulated on each other. Before either can be proved true they must be subjected to the test of coherence.

The chapter on the realistic hypothesis is divided into three major sections: epistemological dualism, metaphysical dualism, and the mind-body problem. These three subjects have been grouped together in one chapter as a means of laying a foundation for the main chapter, which follows on the subject of spiritual pantheism.

Professor Pratt is an epistemological dualist. Knowing involves both a subject and an object. The object is not an ontological object, it is only an epistemological object. It is an object in the realm of essences. It is thought content. Knowledge is possessed. All knowing refers to a subject as well as an object. So both a subject and object are epistemologically real.

The problem of knowledge is not complete however, with just the postulation of the epistemological subject and object.


If the epistemological object is not the ontological object, but only an object of the mind, an object in the realm of essences;



how can one know the ontological object? The epistemological object and the ontological object are not the same thing. They are two different thin s. The epistemological object is really just thought content; the ontological object is a metaphysical reality according to Professor Pratt. The personal idealist will also agree that the ontological object is other than the epistemological object; but to him it is the will of God. The question is bound to arise as to how one can truly know that the epistemological object is the same or even like the ontological object. If they are not alike, knowledge of the existential world through the senses is impossible. If they are alike then knowledge through the senses is possible. Professor Pratt believes that the epistemological object receiveds those qualities intended from the ontological object, and that thus knowledge of the existential world is possible. Thus though he recognizes knowledge to be indirect and representative, he believes that it can be trusted to reveal the true reality.

While epistemology has been concerned with the problem of knowledge, metaphysics has to do with the reality of things that compose the universe. What kind of things are real?

Metaphysical dualism is the hypothesis that both mind and matter are real in the universe. Find and matter are so different in nature that many philosophers in striving to account for the unity in the world, have endeavored to establish




a metaphysical monism. Some have made that monism matter, others mird, and still others some kind of a neutral entity. Professor Pratt believes that all of these attempts at monism have been attempts to dodge the question of the relation of mind and matter.

matter. To be sure the conceptual world of the mind is a world of essence; but in the metaphysical realm the mind is an existent. Mind is presupposed by the very attempt at thou ht, meaning, or knowledge. To deny the reality of mind is to deny the mind of the denier. Mind is likewise presupposed in experience. All experience presupposes a mind or a self.

"If, therefore, a sound epistemology shows that such things as recognition and thought are meaningless unless there be a unifying subject or self, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that such a self does actually be..."


Matter is likewise an existent. Professor Pratt distinguishes between the epistemological object and the ontological object, yet in his epistemology as well as in the correspondence theory of truth he presupposes the existential reality of matter. For he says that though the epistemological object and the ontological object are not the same, the former receives the qualities intended from the latter. Thus a judgment which corresponds with the object needs no further verification

¹ Pratt, PR, 288-89.



than the experience itself. This supposedly proves the metaphysical reality of matter. Professor Pratt refers to several experiences which show that the activities of the material world go on without human bein's either observing or thinking about them. Likewise experiences which are common to large numbers of people are referred to as a means of showing how there is an objective reality to physical things which lies outside the human experience. This does not prove that that which is objective to human experience is either mind or matter, it just shows that it is not human mind. However, it might be the mind of God as the personal idealist believes it is. But the idealist in doing so makes the distinction between the nouneral and phenomenal which Professor Pratt refuses to recognize. Thus Professor Pratt believes that matter must be an independent physical reality.


However, Professor Pratt also believes in the immanence of God. He believes the universe to be an organic whole. This is done through the interaction of the mind and body of God, interaction between mind and matter. Now it seems that in a sense, that if God is completely immanent in the universe and the universe is an organic whole through the process of interaction, that matter cannot be an entirely independent reality. Latter would not be the same matter without the immanence of God. It seems more probable that matter would not exist at all if God did not exist. For the forces of



causation in the realm of matter seem to be forces which cannot be just given forces of matter, but forces which must have their origin in God.

On the other hand, to hold with the personal idealist that matter is a non-reality except in the realm of experience, makes human experience appear illusory to the realist. Space is not the creation of the human mind, for spatial operations continue in the absence of human minds. Thus matter must be the creation of God in the realm of both His experience and the experience of all selves. Much effort was made and many pages scrapped in the attempt to find a solution of this problem between the idealists and the realists, yet it must be left as more or less of an unsolved problem. It might be agreed that personal idealism more coherently explains all experience, but it could hardly be considered fair to the realist to say that the problem is completely solved and closed.

The mind-body problem is the problem of the relation of the mind to the body. By analyzing the bodily functions we see that it comes to be really a problem of the relation of that which is known as mind or thought with the nervous system and more particularily the brain. The materialist and behaviorist make the mind merely the product of the functioning of the brain or body. The Absolute idealist makes it all the functioning of the Absolute. However, between these two extremes stand both the personal realist



and the personal idealist. These two disagree as to the ultimate nature of the body metaphysically, but they agree that the mind and body interact. The personal idealist, however, says that really it is the mind of the human being interacting with the mind of God; while the personal realist must make it an interaction between a human mind and an existentially real matter.


The materialist doctrine regarding the relation of the mind and body is called epiphenomenalism. Mind is a phenomenon caused by the body. Parallelism is another hypothesis regarding the relation between the mind and body, which says that the two run along parallel and are timed so that when one acts the other acts. Interaction is the theory that each influences the other. As it has been said above both the personal realist and the personal idealist believe that interaction is the true hypothesis, though they disagree as to the nature of that with which the mind interacts.

Before Professor Pratt establishes his hypothesis of spiritual pantheism he refutes materialism, dualistic or atheistic pluralism, deism, transcendental theism, the conception of the finite God, and Absolute idealism.

Materialists are not consistent in their arguments.

Different materialists vary considerably in their approach.

Their main thesis is that matter is always the cause of everything. Purpose can never act as a cause. Mind has no influence




on the body. The truth is however, that the facts of science are only the discovery of a sequence of events. The materialist can not explain cause; he only witnesses it. Everday experience in life proves the efficiency of purpose in life. Man is more than just physical; therefore the universe which produced man must be more than just physical. Furthermore, to deny the reality of mind is to deny the denier.

The dualistic and atheistic pluralists avoid materialism, but claim that life is a very infinitesimal part of the universe and that there is no universal purpose. The world is both matter and energy. Interaction is accepted, but there is no universal purpose. The hypothesis becomes scarcely a hypothesis at all; it is not even a coherent description of the phenomenal world. Thus Professor Pratt discards it as being unimportant.

Professor Pratt makes a great error in classifying deism, transcendental theism, and the conception of the finite God, all together. He is severely criticized in this thesis for this generalization of such different hypotheses.

Professor Pratt's chief reason for not liking this group seems to be largely his distaste for the idea that God may be the least bit transcendent, eventhough He be partly immanent.

Professor Pratt spends no time on deism. He makes scarcely any distinction between deism, transcendental theism, and the conception of the finite God. His main argument against the




conception of the finite God seems to be largely wishful thinking. He uses no coherent argument against it, but in fact admits that there is much to be said in favor of it theoretically. He mainly objects to thinking of God as struggling against odds. He uses such terms as "a god down in the dirt"², as William James used to call him, and other such terms and phraseology as to degrade the idea of God's being limited by anthing. He would scarcely even have God limited by values or ideals. He would rather conceive of God as being all powerful and free to do anthing, than to have Him striving for something that was good, or for greater perfection. Professor Pratt seems to recognize the value of this hypothesis, and does not refute it as being impossible, but leaves it as one possibility among two others: Absolute idealism and his own hypothesis.

There is much about Absolute idealism which Professor

Pratt seems to like. It is that same idea of an organic whole
which he retains for his own hypothesis of spiritual pantheism.

He points out the ineveitable problem which will always arise
in Absolute idealism: how can finite selves be a reality if
they are a part of the infinite? Selves are not divisible;
they are wholes. How can finite selves become parts of an
Absolute self. How can the sum of all the experience of

² Pratt, PR, 372.



human selves be God's experience? The experience of one self cannot be the very same experience of another self or of God.

Thus he leaves Absolute idealism because it is inconsistent at this point.


Professor Pratt believes that there must be a Cosmic Self in order to have purpose in the world. Purpose can only be made efficient through a self; purposes can not exist unowned. The universe is an organic whole. The only explanation for such organization is a Cosmic Self. The Cosmic Self is more than just process for there is continual evidence of invention and origination.

The physical world is the body of God. Purpose can be made causal only through some such interaction between mind and matter as seen in the human mind-body relationship, says Professor Pratt. Thus the physical universe serves the same purpose to the Cosmic Self as a body and the process between the two is interaction.

The finite self is real and a separate and free being.


Professor Pratt believes that the finite self had its origin in the Cosmic Self. It grew out of the Cosmic Self something like the development of a bud on a tree; but it is a separate self and has a free will. The reality of this self can only be realized by intuition. The self has been identified by the personal idealists with donsciousness; but Professor Pratt

³ Pratt, PR, 315.



believes that it is a substance, which has qualities and is an existent. Consciousness is only its characterization. Professor Pratt believes that the self is not entirely dependent upon its body and thus that there is at least room for a fond hope of immortality.


The problem of the evil in the universe is one of the most outstanding problems of philosophy. The conception of the finite God is one attempt to solve this problem. Professor Pratt rejects the conception of the finite God, not because it is incoherent, but because he disliked the implication that God was limited. Professor Pratt believes that God must be all powerful above all other things. Power seems to be the highest virtue that can be attributed to God in his estimation. If all powerfulness is attributed to God, then God must be responsible for that which seems to be evil in the world. Professor Pratt gets around this by saying that God has a perspective which gives him values which human beings cannot understand. God is not interested primarily in human values, but has a set of values which are all his own. Thus God is not bad when he acts in ways which appear as evil to human beings, for to him it may be an act of extreme beauty. God is not to be found in the good and beautiful, the sweet and safe alone, but in the austere and terrifying as well. reason for this is man's lack of ability to see things in God's perspective. To God all is good and beautiful.



This is a sacrifice of the idea of the goodness of God and His concern for the goodness of Man, for the virtue of power. If God is all powerful then he is free to improvise, as it were, and make things to suit his immediate desire. It is the contention of this thesis that a God who is interested in the goodness and welfare of man and interested in the perfection of the universe is to be considered more virtuous than a God who though all powerful is using his power to the satisfection of his own desires even though it does produce something beautiful in His perspective. It seems impossible that God would not recognize selves which were free and separate from Himself as being of more value and significance than the beauties of the universe which are subject to His own causation and alteration.

A God who is totally uninterested in man cannot be a personal God, nor can He help build a better social order. God might be admired, but real worship and fellowship with Him would be impossible. Professor Pratt refers to Him as the "Determiner of Destiny which our religious nature demands."4 It seems that our religious nature demands more that God be a good God interested in the development of all life, than that He be all powerful and interested only in developing something which He Himself can appreciate.

⁴ Pratt, PR, 372.



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
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
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
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